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ABSTRACT
A critical examination of Popper’s falsificationism as a methodological 
criterion of demarcation led to the development of a supplementary means of 
distinguishing science from pseudo- science The discipline is made the unit of 
appraisal and its pattern of historical development b  used as the indicator of 
demarcation. Results of a test of this indicator against astrology and physical 
optics accord with our basic judgments of these disciplines. The indicator 
effectively reveals that scientific creationism is pseudo-science, and that 
evolutionary biology is genuine science.
Three fundamental approaches to scientific investigation, viz. 
verificationism , falsificationism  and m ulti-cornered testing (M CT) are 
contrasted. MCT is distinguished by competition between hypotheses, which 
makes it more informative than at least the naive versions of the other two 
approaches. While competition does not produce immediate victors, it does make 
demands on theories, which can be augmented by prescribing a series of 
independent tests. The comparative method implies the existence of two types of 
evidence. Common evidence is that which io predicted or explained by two or 
more rival hypotheses. Discriminatory evidence favours one rival over the 
others.
It is argued that in both the fields of species biology and speciation there 
have been instances of over-relying on common evidence, o f indistinctly 
defining alternative hypotheses, of ro t following their logical consequences and 
of not using exisiing discriminatory evidence to adjudicate between these 
hypotheses. Species concepts and definitions of modes of speciation are 
evaluated. Normative principles are suggested for defining species and other 
important terms in evolutionary biology, and for testing species concepts and 
modes of speciation. The advantages and limitations of a historical indicator of
iii
demarcation and the merits and principles of the comparative approach to 
method are discussed and illustrated using the analoev of a mathematical game.
Scientific crcanomsni is shown to have a coating of scientific method, 
but to have systematically violated fundamental methodological principles. 
D arn in’* method in contrast, had a comparative structure, and distinguished 
between common *nd discriminatory evidence. While there are methodological 
problems sn evolutionary biology, these are shown to be minor in comparison to 
that four*! in to c n o fk  ciratxxiiun.
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1CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary theory has been called the supreme integrative principle of 
biology. In the face of its importance, it is disturbing that its credentials have 
recently been disputed even by respected authors. Popper, who has since 
recanted (Popper 1980), claimed that Darwinism was a metaphysical rather than 
a scientific research programme (Popper 1976:172). Others have claimed that 
that evolu^onary theory does not make genuine predictions (Scriven 1959, 
Popper 1976). Some have argued that the theory of natural selection is 
tautologous (e.g. Macbeth 1971:65) and that much of evolutionary theory is 
based on circular argument (Peters 1976). Kerkut (1960:7) claimed that the 
General Theory of Evolution consists of a set of unverifiable assumptions. 
Denton (1985:77) says that Darwin’s General Theory is a "highly speculative 
hypothesis " Many biologists have accepted tiie criticisms says Ruse (1981), to 
the point 'hat the British Museum of Natural History decided, for a time, to 
reword their displays so as not to create the impression that evolution was a fact.
Since then it has become apparent that the original criticisms of 
evolutionary theory far from spel! the demise of evolutionary theory. Some have 
been based on a misunderstanding of evolution (Ruse 1977, Gould 1983, von 
Schilcher and Tennant 1984:91-105, Rosenberg 1985:216-219), of scientific 
method (Caplan 1977) or of both (Kitcher 1982, Williams 1973, 1982, 1985, 
hutuyma 1982). The tautology objection has, I think, been adequately answered 
(Gould 1977:40-48, 1983, Lewontin 1978, Thompson 1981:51 73). That the 
scientific status of such a weli established theory could even be questioned
2suggests the need for a continued look at the probltm of demarcation- that is, the 
problem of distinguishing between science and pseudo-science.
This need is further suggested by the fact that although most critics agree 
that the so called 'creation science’ or ’scientific creationism’ is pseudo-science 
(Feyerabend (1981:143) is an exception), they do not aiways agree as to why. 
Scientific creationists uphold a particular literalistic interpretation of the biblical 
account of origins, which they present as a "scientific model ” According to this 
view the universe came into being in six days of twenty-four hours between six 
and ten thousand years ago. Much valuable work has been done in appraising 
creation science (e.g. Kitcher 1982, Futuyma 1982, Root-Bemstein 1983, 
Godfrey 1983). However, conflicting claims are sometimes made against it. 
Judge Overton (1984:380) ruled that the position was unfalsifiable and so a 
pseudo-science. Laudan (1982:150), a philosopher of science, asserts that 
Lreation-science far from being unfalsifiable. is actually false. Dolby (1987) says 
that it is a science, but an archaic and corrupting sort.
Advocates of creation science are themselves unsettled over its 
credentials. Thus we have them claiming (Bird 1979) that "special creation can 
be presented from a strictly scientific standpoint...", and yet because it deals with 
past events it is not really a scientific theory but a "model".
Kucher (1982:124-126) distinguishes between three types of creationism. 
Let us call the first type reiigious creationism. Here no attempt is made to justify 
belief in a creation on scientific grounds. A second type which will be called 
simply creationism does seek af'er justification on scientific grounds. The claim 
here that there is no purely naturalistic account of origins which is scientifically 
acceptable. The third type is scientific creationism or creation science. Scientific 
creationism must be distinguished because it is only one variant of creationism. 
My concern will not be with religious creationism at all. The object of chapter 2
3will be to determine the scientific status of evolutionary biology and creationism.
To achieve this a prior question must be answered: What is it about 
science that makes it scientific? This is known as the problem of demarcation. 
Lakatos (1978), Lcsee (1980:178-193), Laudan (1933) and Dolby (1987) review 
proposed solutions to the problem. The search has been for some criteria that are 
jointly necessary and sufficient for a system to be classed as a science.
Despite its long history, we do not seem very close to a solution. Many 
suggestions have been made. Anstotle thought that genuine scientific knowledge 
had the status o f  necessary truth (Losee 1980:14). B ridgem an’s early 
operationism claimed that genuinely scientific concepts must be connected to 
measuring procedures (Losee 1980:178-182). The criterion o f the Logical 
Positivists was verifiability: genuinely scientific statements must be empirically 
verifiable (Oldroyd 1986:232). The conventionalist approach was elitism: it was 
for the scientific establishment to say what was genuinely scientific or not 
(Lakatos 1978) For Popper ( 1972a:40-41) the criterion was falsifiability: a 
scientific or empirical system of statements is one in which its logical form is 
such that it is possible to refute the system by experience. Each proposal has its 
problems, to the point that many philosophers of science believe that, at the 
moment, there exists no decisive, universal characterization of science (Lakatos 
1978:107-120, Laudan 1983).
Then there is the question of how to characterize the problem of 
demarcation. Bartley (1968:44-49) says that Popper did not separate out 
metaphysics and pseudo-science in his quest to solve the problem. Many 
philosophers of science feel th^t the problem of demarcating between science 
and metaphysics is not a very important one. Laudan (1983) says that the 
important question is whether or not an enterprise is legitimate.
4We will not be concerned with non-science at all, but with science and 
pseudo-science. Furthermore, the first object will be to distinguish merely 
between science and pseudo-science rather than to demarcate between these in 
the traditional sense. There will be no attempt, then, to decisively characterize 
these in terms of method. This is not to say that method is unimportant. In later 
chapters we will be concerned with method, but under a different heading. The 
object there will be with discerning the difference between good and bad method. 
Why this course is taken will become clear later. We will see that the great 
iversity in science makes it difficult to demarcate on methodological grounds.
Many authors have argued, rather convincingly I think, that evolutionary 
biology is a genuine and successful science (Ruse 1982, Futuyma 1982) and that 
creation science is pseudo-science (Kitcher 1982, Roo -Bernstein 1983) o; at 
least very bad science (Dolby 1987). Ruse (1982) and Futuyma (1982) argue 
that evolutionary biology is good science for several reasons. Not only is it 
testable, it has come through ihc tests very successfully. It explains much and is 
very fruitful, having spawned new and productive lines of research. In contrast, 
creation science fairs very badly, ana also for several reasons. Some parts of 
creiViion science are false (Gould 1983). It claims, fcr instance, that barring 
extinction, all life forms were present throughout the earth’s history. The fossil 
record contradicts this position of course. Other parts are unfalsifiable. There is 
the claim that the stars were created with their light rays so as to give the universe 
an apparent age (Morris 1976:65,66). It has been repeatedly pointed out that 
claims like these are extremely problematic from a scientific perspective, 
whether we regard them as strictly unfalsifiable or as explanatorily thin fairy 
tales (Smith and Ward 1984).
The sciences and pseudo-sciences are what they are for many reasons. This 
makes it difficult to find a common denominator for each which distinguishes 
them. One objective of chapter 2 is to show that a common denominator can be 
found, if we look at something other than method. I suggest that we look at the
*)». "r • ' , ,i
5effects these methods have jn  the history of a discipline. In doint this we shall 
discover a way of telling genuine science and pse'ido-science apart without 
having to give a characterization of their methods. In other words the aim is to 
develop an indicator rather than a criterion of demarcation; to develop a kind of 
litmus paper which can be dipped into a discipline to test its scientific credentials. 
We shall find that this indicator has limitations but also some special advantages.
This indicator is the behaviour of a discipline over time. It will be 
argued that a genuine science is characteristic in showing considerable reduction 
in theoretical diversity over time, whereas in a pseudo-science the degree of 
theoretical diversity remains relatively constant.
This indicator will be applied to physical optics, as an example of an 
obvious science, and astrology as an obvious pseudo-science to check its 
adequacy. The scientific credentials of evolutionary biology and creation science 
will be tested in terms of this indicator. The conclusion I will reach is that the 
former is a genuine science, and the latter a pseudo-science.
Once evolutionary- biology is identified as a genuine science, a second 
question emerges and that concerns method. Do evolutionary biologists practice 
good method? Criticism of the methodology of evolutionary biologists has come 
from other workers in the field (e.g. Futuyma and Mayer 1980, Paterson 1981) 
and even from respected authors outside the field (e.g. Macbeth 1971). Paterson 
(1981) says that there is a need "for a more consistent logic if we are to reduce 
dispute and disagreement and improve understanding in evolutionary biology." 
Much of the disagreement is not over what the evidence is, but over how to 
interpret it. Thus what some authors (e.g. Tauber and Tauber 1977a) take as 
ev idence for sym patric speciation  another (H endrickson 1978) finds 
inconclusive. What one author (e.g. Mayr 1963:17) takes as evidence for the 
Biological Concept of Species, another finds unsatisfactory (Paterson 1985).
6The second main aim of the thesis is to determine whether evolutionary 
biologists have practiced good method. Before this can be done an adequate 
criterion for evaluating method is needed. Much has been said on this subject by 
philosophers of science. The goal of chapter 3 is to arrive at a very basic criterion 
for evaluating method, and one which can be applied readily to actual research 
approaches.
For the sake of simplicity, disci ssion of method will take place within a 
purely deductive framework, altho’:;h  the points made probably apply more 
widely. My main object is to show that there are three distinct procedures within 
such a framework. These are verificationism, in which a hypothesis is supported 
by seeking to confirm it; falsificationism. in which a hypothesis is tested by 
trying to refute it; and what I will call multi-cornered testing (MCT), in which 
rival hypotheses are forced to confront each other. More sophisticated versions of 
verificationism and falsification involve theory comparison. The contrast made 
here will be between MCT and what are known as the naive versions.
Now it might be questioned whether all this needs to be said. Naive 
venficationisrr. and naive falsificationism have been discredited (Popper 
1972b:35-37, Lakatos 1970:93-116). Many philosophers of science assume that 
a significant pan of scientific method consists in choice of the best theories, and 
have focused on how to explicate formally theory comparison (Andersson 1978, 
Radnitsky and Andersson 1978, Glymour 1983, van Fraasen 1983).
The approach taken here is justified because, as we shall see, some of the 
problems in biological research are the result of a confounding of the three basic 
methods. It will be argued that this has led to the practice of supporting 
con flic ting  hypotheses with the same evidence. I w iil show that the 
distinctiveness of the three has been blurred because of a preoccupation with 
logical validity as the basic criterion for evaluating method. I suggest that a more 
appropriate criterion in science is how much an argument tells us. On the basis of
this criterion I show that MCT is not only distinct, but is the better of the three. 
The concept is an old one. One purpose of chapter 3 is to rid the concept of 
notions discredited by contemporary philosophers of science, to empnasize the 
distinctiveness and superiority o f this procedure against the alternatives, and to 
express the concept in a way that readily communicates to a biologist.
In the next two chapters, practices within selected fields in evolutionary 
biology are evaluated according to the criteria established in chapter 3. Chapter 
4 deals with the species problem and chapter 5 with speciation. The main finding 
>s that rival hypotheses are often supported by an inadequate type of evidence; a 
type of evidence which can be interpreted to favour two or more of the rivals. It 
is submitted that the way forward is to test hypotheses comparatively. Evidence 
often exists that discriminates between hypotheses without its significance being 
fully appreciated. For the comparative approach to work it must be recognised 
that there are different types of evidence, alternative hypotheses must be 
distinctly defined, and the logical consequences of these rigorously followed.
In chapter 6 a mathematical game is described which is useful in 
illustrating principles of demarcation and of method. The points of similarity 
?t\> ■ -*11 the analog” and sc^'ice ~£ discussed. The game can be used to simulate 
bom science and psejdo-science. In so doing it suggests interesting features
about each.
In the final chapter I discuss the limitations of an indicator of 
demarcation showing that these are offset by its special advantages. Next, 
multi-cornered testing is evaluated according to two sets of criteria. Firstly, 
whether it can be given an a priori justification i.e. whether it can be justified in 
principle; secondly, whether it can be given an a posteriori ju .tification i.e. 
whether there are any cases where the method has been practiced and has lead to 
successful research. Finally, some concluding remarks are made about the 
methods used in evolutionary biology. The great success of the discipline shows
that its methods are on the whole good. However, there are places where less than 
• t : best in method is used. I show why this has happened and suggest solutions, 
"ucd that the w j . forward is to seek not just for evidence that will support 
eory, but for ev.dence that will favour the better theory over its rivals.
9CHAPTER 2: DEMARCATION, EVOLUTIONARY 
BIOLOGY AND CREATIONISM
The problem of demarcation
Popper's notion of falsifiability is the most universally accepted 
criterion of demarcation, at least amongst scientists. Biologists have often 
criticized rival theories >n the grounds that they are unfalsifiable (Kitcher 
1985:58-61). We have already seen (p .l) that Popper (1974:172) used the 
criterion to classify Darwinism as a metaphysical research programme rather 
than a scientific one, but has since recanted (1980). A notion with such 
potentially far- reaching consequences must be carefully examined. The object of 
this first section is to describe Popper’s criterion and his route to it. Next, 1 will 
discuss the criticisms that can, and have, been levelled at his proposals with the 
purpose nf discovering their ments and limitations and what it is about the 
demarcation problem that make it so difficult. Possible solutions to the problem 
will arise from this discussion.
Popper’s Route To ’Falsifiability’
The central problem of interest to Popper was how to distinguish between 
science and pseudo-science (Popper 1972b:33). His quest b ^ a n  with certain 
basic judgments: Einstein’s Relativity and Newtonian Mechanics are examples 
o f what is obviously science while M arx’s theory o f history, F reud ’s 
psycho-analysis and A dler’s theory of individual psychology are suspect. 
Becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the latter three theories, Popper 
wondered what these had in common which distinguished them from the former
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two theories. He concluded that it was their apparent explanatory power. "The 
world was full of verifications" of these theories. In contrast, he noted that 
relativity theory could be refuted by the failure of occurrence of a single 
prediction. It was subject to great risk. He concluded that it must be possible for 
an empirical scientific s> stem to be refuted by experience. Tautological ciaims 
would be excluded from science since these are necessarily true and could never 
be falsified.
Popper immediately saw that this requirement, which concerns the logical 
structure of statements in a theory, is necessary but not sufficient for the theory 
to count as scientific. The reason is that it would fail to exclude those 
pseudo-sciences which tenaciously hang on to falsifiable but false claims. He 
therefore gave the additional requirement that science should be characte- ized by 
its method; by its theories being boldly subjected to test: "It is the boldness of a 
conjecture which takes a real risk - the risk of being tested, and refuted, the risk 
of clashing with reality... thus my proposal was, and is, that it is ti.is... boldness, 
together with the readiness to look out for tests and refutations, which 
distinguishes ’em pirical’ science from non-science, and especially l'rom 
pre-scientific myths and metaphysics" (Popper 1976:9,81). His proposal has at 
least three fundamental components:
a) He begins with basic judgments, deriving his criterion from these.
b) He compares obvious sciences to suspect ones.
c) His falsificationism criterion is a methodological one.
We will see that each of these components has serious limitations.
11
Beginning with basic judgments.
Popper did not only rely on basic judgments in developing his 
falsifiability criterion. His account also depends on an asymmetry between 
verification and falsification. He noticed that universal statements could never be 
verified, but could be falsified by a single contrary instance. Nevertheless, 
Popper does admit that, historically, he began with basic judgments. The problem 
with this approach is that it is somewhat circuiar. One decides beforehand what 
is science and pseudo-science, and then derives a criterion which is used to 
distinguish science from pseudo-science. Popper’s approach is puzzling because 
he is a demarcationist and as Lakatos points o u t"... for demarcationists, a theory 
rmy be pseudo-scientific even though it is eminently ’plausible’ and everybody 
believes in it and it may be scientifically valuable even if it is unbelievable and 
nobody believes in it" (Lakatos 1980:109). Freud’s psycho-analysis may be 
scientific even though Popper doesn’t think it is. If an astrologer was asked to 
devue a criterion for demarcation he might begin with the basic judgment that 
astrology is the science of all sciences and exclude relativity!
There are serious limitations, then, in deriving a crii nor. of demarcation 
from basic judgments since these may be wrong. This does not mean that they are 
valueless. They are useful in checking whether a criterion, already supported on 
o th e r  g ro u n d s , c o rre c tly  d is tin g u ish e s  the o b v io u s  sc ie n c e s  from  
pseudo-sciences. However, even if we grant that Popper was right in his basic 
judgments, there are still difficulties.
Comparing obvious sciences with obvious pseudo- sciences
If we must Degin with basic judgments it is important to make the right 
comparison. The comparison that Popper made is risky because the possible 
diversity in science is likely to be ignored. It is unsafe to regard Einstein’s 
Relativity and Newtonian Mechanics as representative of all of science. It is
unsafe because therc may be other genuinely scientific disciplines which are not 
testable in exactly the same way as the hard sciences. Ghiselin (1969:30- 31) for 
example has shown that Darwin’s geological theories were testable as a whole, 
even though  certa in  subsid ia ry  sta tem en ts w ere not. An innocuous 
unfalsifiability of this sort is also found in Meteorology and Geomorphology 
(Lagers petz 1969).
The importance of appreciating diversity in science can be illustrated with 
the help of some taxonomy. Imagine a taxonomist setting out to discover the 
distinctive feature of the class mammalia. He chooses the orang-outan as the 
epitome of what is mammal and a lizard as an obvious non-mammal. He notices 
thar the orang-outan doe. not lay eggs whereas lizards do. He concludes that the 
hallmark of mammalia is viviparity. He would be wrong of course. The 
duck-billed platypus is a mammal and yet lays eggs. The problem with our 
imaginary taxonomist’s approach is that the diversity in the class mammalia is 
not appreciated. To arrive at an adequate distinguishing feature ail recognized 
tner.oers must be considered. This was not Popper’s method. Only the pride of 
the physical sciences was examined. A common denominator was not sought 
betwten all fields reckoned to be sciences.
The consequence of our imaginary taxonomist’s approach is a criterion that 
is too narrow, requiring the rejection of genuine members o f mammalia. The 
strict version of Popper’s criterion has the same result. Strict falsifiability (i.e. 
that every sta'ement in a theory must be directly testable) is not characteristic of 
of all fields reckoned to be sciences. The narrow criterion wouid force us to 
exclude meteorology and geomorphology. Popper (1974:981) has worried over 
thir problem, and has accordingly adjusted his original position. As a suggested 
improvement to his criterion, a theory should be regarded as scientific to the 
degree to which it is testable. This would place meteorology a little lower than 
physics on the scientific scale since meteorological theories are notoriously 
difficult to test. The problem is that the causal connections in meteorological
4
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systems are extremely complex; one has to take into account a large number of 
relevant conditions. In spite of this the enterprise is apparently legitimate. If so, 
then Popper’s criterion might help in ranking the sciences, if we really want to dc 
this, but does not help us judge between genuine sciences and pseudo-sciences. 
Laudan (1983) agrees that the important question to ask of a discipline is whether 
or not it is legitimate. The third feature of Popper’s proposal that we will consider 
is that his criterion is a methodological rather than an epistemic one.
Falsificationism: characterizing science by its method
For Popper science is distinctive in its method. Scientific theories are 
boldly subjected to test. In this section we will see that:
i) Falsificationism is an clement, but not the essence of science.
ii) There are times when it may be admissible to evade falsification.
111) It is easy for pseudo-sciences to pay lip-service to what is ostensibly
scientific method.
For these reasons falsificationism, on its own, does not adequately 
distinguish science from pseudo-science. Many philosophers of science are 
saying that the prospect of discovering some criterion of demarcation is bleak, if 
not impossible In a latter section, I suggest that these difficulties may be 
circumvented by altering our appruach to the problem. Instead of searching for a 
criterion of demarcation it may be more fruitful to search for an indicator of 
demarcation.
4
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First, it will be necessary to review Popper’s proposal. One of Popper’s 
(1979:106-108) major contributions is his distinction of three worlds. These are: 
World 1 - the world of material things; World 2 - the world of subjective beliefs; 
and World 3 - the world of ideas, art, science etc. In demarcation we are 
concerned with appraising the products of knowledge i.e. we are concerned with 
distinguishing between domains within World 3. Let us set up a basic statement 
about what science is. A statement that should be fairly well agreed upon is that 
science is characterized by the world having some say in shaping out theories, or 
to use Poppenan terminology: World 3 is in some way influenced by World 1. 
There is a connection between the real world and our ideas about it.
Now what is important to note here is that Popper does not begin with the 
connection that scientific theories should have with the real world, but the man­
ner in which they are tested, rhese two theses I will call the connection thesis and 
the methodological thesis. However, a theory as a whole m a- be constrained by 
the evidence, even though some of its constituent hypotheses are difficult to 
boldly subject to test For example, there is no doubt that speciation occurs even 
though in some cases it is difficult to decide between alternative modes. These 
two theses must be distinguished, therefore, and the connection thesis may be 
more fundamental than the other. This point is diagrammatically represented in
Falsificationism is an element, but not the essence of science
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Connection thesis.- 
the nature of science.o
Methodological thesis: 
the manner In which 
scientific theories 
are tested
f- igure 2-1. The relationship between the connection and methodological 
theses.
4
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If our criterion of demarcation is merely a tool for distinguishing science 
from pseudo-science, rather than making a fundamental statement about what 
science is, we should rather speak of an indicator of demarcation. The reason is, 
as I will show below, that there is no necessary relationship between what a 
science is, as expressed by the connection thesis, and Popper’s methodological 
thesis. Popper’s criterion does not really isolate what is scientific about science 
and pseudo-scientific about pseudo-science.
Firstly, Popper’s methodological thesis does not isolate what is wrong 
with pseudo-sciences such as creation science. Creation science is not 
pseudo-science simply because it is not boldly subjected to test, but for several 
reasons. Only one of these is its appeal to miracle (Gould 1984:127). Another is 
their distorting of the evidence (Hardin 1983). As we have already seen, some of 
their claims are unfalsifiable while others are false.
Secondly, perfectly genuine sciences may nut quite follow the pattern of 
testing that falsificatiomsm requires. Certain theories may be testable as a whole 
and yet have subsidiary hypotheses which are not as testable. Are they thereby 
less scientific?
Consider, for example, Darwinian histories. Kitcher (1985:58-75) 
distinguishes two types. Minimal Darwinian Histor . specify the sort o f changes 
that take place along an evolving lineage. Ambitious Darwinian Histories try to 
identify the causes of the evolutionary changes. Now Kitcher points out that the 
former are more easily confirmed then the latter. It is often hard to test between 
rival Ambitious Darwinian Histories.
Ghiselin (1969:31) reports that many of the attacks on Darwinism are 
based on the demand that the parts be as testable as the whole. It has become 
evident that this demand is unreasonable. Quite acceptable tests of a statistical 
kind can be made c f evolutionary theory as a whole (Ghiselin 1969:66, Williams
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1973, 1985, Kitchcr 1985:58-75, Rosenberg 1985:216-219). The important thing 
is to ask the right sort of questions They should net be about individuals, but 
about populations (Williams 1973). To take a simple example: given two parents 
with sickle- cell anemia a genetic counsellor could not predict whether their 
first-born would be affected. However, geneticists can, and have, successfully 
predicted the proportions of homozygotes and heterozygotes in a population.
This is not to say that nothing of falsif'cationism can be saved. It has its 
place: it is just not the whole story. Kitcher (1985:61) says it well: "employing 
the falsifiability criterion to settle methodological issues [he means naively] in ... 
the theory of evolution ... is about as profitable as trying to perform delicate 
surgery with a rusty kitchen knife."
There are times when it mav be legitimate to evade falsification
This is something that has been accepted by Popper and has been 
convincingly demonstrated by many philosophers of science (e.g. Duhem 
1968:1 /3 , Q uine 1953:41, K itcher 1982:42-45, 1985:59-61). Lakatos 
(1970:100-101) expresses the argument well. Imagine a physicist accepting 
Newtonian Mechanics and some initial conditions, and from these plotting the 
path of a planet Pi. Then the planet is observed to deviate from the predicted 
path. Does this constimte a falsification of Newton’s theory? Lakatos says no, 
not necessarily. It could always be argued that another planet P2 is perturbing the 
orbit of P |. Even the most admired theories, then, fail to forbid any observable 
states of affaini. One could always invoke a hitherto unknown cause to explain 
the deviation from the expected.
Furthermore, we surely do not want to label Newtonian Mechanics "s 
pseudo-science because it is not strictly falsifiable. The important question 
seems to be whether there actually exist causal factors which are influencing the
expected results. It there arc, the deviation from the expected would not
constitute a falsification.
Many or most w ould agree that there is som ething right about 
falsificationism; we should be willing to give up theories in the face of contrary 
evidence. However, it is not legitimate to elevate it to an inviolable rule. Below 
is an attempt to isolate what it is about science that makes it too simple to accept 
falsificationism, at least of the naive kind. We have noted that a theory can 
always be saved from falsification by the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses. The 
central problem shifts, then, towards the character of the ad hoc hypothesis. 
Popper ( 1972a:81-84) accordingly provides additional rules for distinguishing 
between genuine and ad hoc adjustments to theories; for distinguishing between 
hypotheses introduced just to save a theory and hypotheses which add empirical 
content to the theory. In chapter 3 it is argued that it is very difficult, if not 
impossible to distinguish these on a priori grounds even though serious attempts 
have been made to do this (Leplin 1982). I submit that it safest to make a 
judgment with the benefit o f hindsight.
Let me elaborate using Lakatos' example. The path of a planet Pi is 
plotted on the basis of Newtonian Mechanics and initial conditions. The planet 
deviates from the calculated path. So it is proposed that a planet P2 perturbs Pi. 
Does this constitute an ad hoc hypothesis? We do not want to say so if planet P2 
actually exists and is exerting a gravitational pull on Pi. But this is precisely 
what we do not know; at a given moment we require knowledge which is not 
available to determine whether a hypothesis is ad hoc or genuine.
Now, it is not that nothing of falsificationism can be saved. Lakatos 
(1970:100) must surely be wrong when he says that scientific theories cannot 
forbid any observable states of affairs since, in the words of Ruse (1982), 
Newtonian mechanics forbids planets to move in square orbits. However it does
PMiBrift.....I*--
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seem that falsi ion requires h indsight. We cannot dem and instant
falsification.
Pseudo-scientists can easily pay lip-service to scientific method
This does not, of course, invalidate falsificationism as a criterion of 
demarcation. What it does mean is that at the practical level we have to be able 
to distinguish between genuine and fake attempts at pursuing falsificationism. 
Philosophers of scier.~e regard astrology as a typical pseudo-science. Yet the 
methods of astrologers are sometimes very similar to thosefound in the 
unequivocal sciences (Eysenck 1984V For evolutionists creation-science is a 
pseudo-science yet Laudan (1982:151) notes that scientific creationists have 
sometimes turned back on their original views. He says further (1982:153) that it 
is very easy for creation-scientists to spccify in advance under what conditions 
they would give up their views. All they need do is to make it so that these 
conditions are very unlikely to ever occur. They could say that they would give 
up their theory if a clear intermediate between apes and men could be found in 
the fossil record. Of course this is based on a misunderstanding of evolutionary 
theory. Now, a deeper analysis of these pseudo- sciences should reveal that it is 
only in appearance that they mimic scientific method. But these considerations 
have to be taken into account to exclude safely certain pseudo-sciences on 
methodological grounds. The object of the next section will be to see if these 
difficulties can be circumvented by devising a supplementary indicator of 
demarcation.
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Towards an indicator of demarcation
Bypassing the difficulties with falsificationism
We have seen that one problem with Popper’s criterion of demarcation is 
that at any given moment it is impossible to decide whether a hypothesis is ad  
hoc or not. With hindsight the decision is easy. Most people today would clearly 
recognize phlogiston theory as ad hoc. This is because they h, e had the benefit 
of twentieth century scientific knowledge, which was not available at the time 
phlogiston theory seemed a genuine alternative. This seems to have led 
philosophers of science, particularly Lakatos (1970) to suspect that when 
devising a criterion of demarcation one should not focus on a theory’s status at 
any moment, but on the performance of a series of theories.
Lakatos (1970) distinguishes between what h~ calls progressive and 
degenerating problemshifts. A progressive problemshift, in contrast to the other, 
is a research programme which is fruitful, in which new facts are being 
discovered etc. This criterion has been used with some success to exclude 
creationism (Kitcher 1982:124-164). It does seem promising to alter the unit of 
appraisal.
Another difficulty in devising a criterion of demarcation is that there is 
some diversity in science. Even if there were such a thing as the ’essence of 
science' it is possible that this would be indefina’ le. Ii: may well be that such an 
essence is an attitude held by a community of scientists. These difficulties may 
be circumvented by using the outcome of method (whatever this may be) rather 
than the methods themselves as the criterion.
It seems, then, that our indicator of demarcation should include time, and 
should be based on the outcome of method. What indicator would serve this
purpose?
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First, we need to decide on a unit of appraisal. For the Logical Positivists 
it was the statement. For Popper it was a system of statements or a theory. For 
l^akatos it was a series of theories. I propose that we take the trend further and 
make the unit of appraisal the discipline. For our purposes, a discipline can be 
defined as an area of study with all the theories that have ever been proposed in 
it. Examples are physical optics, astrology, psychoanalysis, geomorphology and 
parapsychology. My thesis is that the pattf-;, ot theory succession in a discipline 
is a good indicator of its scientific or pseude-scientific status
My argument is in the classical Realist tradition (there are. in fac', 
several contemporary version iHaack 198*7 ie classical Realist argues for 
the existence of a real world the ground :::at this would explain the success 
or progress of science. In this argument the uccess of science is the given. The 
conclusion is the existence of an independent inysicai world. If we make the reai 
world the given, then the suc-ess of discipline will mark it out as genuinely 
scientific. Several authors hav sugge :ed progress as a criterion of demarcation 
(e.g. Lakatos 1970:116-1191 ’’here j i t .  however, problems with this notion.
One of these is the dit* —  in defining 'success' or ’progress.’ Another is 
that the arguments for Realism ire not conclusive (Lau^an 1981a, Putnam 1982). 
For example, Laudan (198, .hat it has sometimes nappened that very
successful theories, succesv- accounting for a !arp umber of facts, have 
later turned out to be false _ ■ theories w, re thou to reier to parts of a
real world. Might not c «r;irrnri)r_' md successful "seories actually not 
genuinely refer to the reai ~ori_
To these sorts i • obi: on ner have been revxmses and counters to 
these responses (e.g. Hardin .. .: M iscnnerg 1982, Launan 1984 We will not 
pursue this discussion uffi. u> .. nat the adequacy of our indicator of 
demarcation does d e p a r t  on Itae co g n rv  o f  the Realist argument, and mat there 
have been attempt' develop a tor— i Realism of the type neede- iere (e.g.
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Almeder 1987); one which retains the classical belief in the existence of a real 
world, but which takes into account the criticisms of the anti-realists.
Our argument begins with certain basic assumptions (as opposed to basic 
judgments) about the nature of scientific disciplines versus pseudo-scientific 
ones. The question now is whether one can predict what the behaviour of their 
theories would be like? If this behaviour is markedly different, then a useful 
indicator of demarcation will have been found. Later we will use basic 
judgments to test the adequacy of this indicator. This approach is two pronged. 
Traditionally demarcationists fell into two camps. Prescriptive demarcationists 
set up an a priori criterion which had to be satisfied before something can count 
as a science. Descriptive demarcationists dissected out the essential elements of 
what they took to be science (Dolby 1987). This account uses both approaches. 
Circularity is avoided because I use basic judgments as a check and not as the 
foundation stone for the indicator.
The first step is to make a fundamental statement about the nature of 
science that must be true of anything that one would want to claim to be science. 
Here is the statement: Theories in the genuine sciences are constrained by the 
real world through experience. This statement lies at the heart of many claims 
about science. Ruse (1982:132), for example, says: "It seems fairly clear, that 
what distinguishes science from non-science is the fact that scientific claims 
reflect, and somehow can be checked against empirical experience - ultimately, 
the data that we get through our senses." It can be traced in Popper’s (1972a:41) 
claim: "It must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by 
experience." Ultimately, it can be reduced to the claim that scientific disciplines 
are subject to the selective pressures of the real world; the products of knowledge 
(world 3) are connected to the real world (world 1). Although this statement tells 
us something about what science is, it does not help us distinguish science from 
pseudo-scien-e; it may however, help us predict something about the nature of 
the products of knowledge which would be peculiar to science. 1 submit that it
can; that it predicts a distinctive historical pattern of behaviour for scientific 
disciplines.
If a discipline’s theories are being genuinely constrained by the real world, 
then one would expect that in each successive stage of its development the range 
of potentially acceptable theories w ou 'J be progressively reuuced. Bechtel 
(1984) would agree. He suggests that "progress could be recognized as occurring 
within a science if selection forces continually narrowed the domain of accept­
able theories." The beginnings of scier.ce will be marked by great theoretical 
diversity; widely contrasting theories will enjoy equal favour. The reason is that 
there is not enough feeuback from the real world to exclude many alternatives. In 
time, with incoming data, progressively more and more alternatives can be ex­
cluded Jer the influence of the real world scientific disciplines will operate as 
a negative feedback or self-correcting system (Sparkes 1981, Blackhowitz 1987) 
and will appear to be goal orientated (see figure 2-2). A number of authors have 
given a similar description of this process using biological evolution as an anal­
ogy (e.g. Toulmin 1967, Popper 1974:413-463, Lcwontin 1970).
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L et us co n trast th is p a tte rn  to w hat we w ould  ex p ec t from  a 
pseudo-science. In this case data from the physical world would not have a 
constraining influence on proposed theories. Consequently there would be no 
progressive reduction in the range of acceptable theories. Even after the 
discipline has been around for a long time, widely differing theories would be 
equally highly esteemed. The discipline is characterized by great theoretical 
diversity as in the case of a new science. So, depending on whether the physical 
world has a say in the theories of a discipline, its pattern of historical 
development will be very different. This is represented in table 2-1.
Ta b l e  2 - 1 .  E x p e c t e d  p a t t e r n s  I n  t h e  h i s t o r y  o f  g e n u i n e  
s c i e n c e s  and  p s e u d o - s c i e n c e s .
D i s c i p l i n e  P r e m i s s  E x p e c t e d  p a t t e r n
G e n u i n e  T h e o r l e s a r e  D i m i n i s h i n g
s c i e n c e  c o n s t r a i n e d  t h e o r e t i c a l
by t h e  r e a l  
w o r l d .
d l v e r s l t y
P s e u d o
s c i e n c e
T h e o r i e s  a r e  
n o t  c o n s t r a i n e d  
by t h e  r e a l
S t a s i s  i n  
t h e o r e t i  c a 1 
di  v e r s  i t y .
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This feature of the sciences is useful to us. Presented with a several 
disciplines claiming to be sciences, we will be able to identify the genuine ones. 
Genuinely scientific enterprises will be marked by an ongoing reduction in 
theoretical diversity. This historical pattern will be called exclusionary 
convergence. Pseudo sciences, in contrast, will be marked by great theoretical 
diversity and stasis. The indicator of demarcation used here is that of success, but 
success is seen here as the ability to exclude a greater and greater range of 
possible theories.
Traces of the idea of exclusionary convergence can be found in the writings 
of many philosophers of science. Peirce (1940:50) mentions the elimination of 
ideas in a process he likens to Darwinian evolution. Kuhn (1962:10-22) sees this 
pattern, but only in a particular stage in the development of science- the route 
from Multi paradigmatic Science to Normal Science. Lakatos’ interest in the 
historical development of science is seen in his altering the unit of appraisal from 
the single theory to a series of theories (Lakatos 1970:118-119).
With Lakatos we see some attempt to demarcate using the pattern in a 
succession of theories. Progressive problemshifts are research programmes, 
involving a series of theories, which are fruitful. However, Lakatos’ unit of 
appm isJ is still much restricted .n time. As mentioned earlier, we will use the 
discipline as a unit ot appraisal. Furthermore, unlike Lakatos, we will not be 
attem pting to dem arcate in the traditional sense of giving a definitive 
characterization of science and pseudo-scienc:.
There are both advantages and limitations to this approach. We saw earlier 
that a problem with using scientific method as a criterion is that pseudo-scientists 
can pay lip service to method. This may not always be easy to detect. Using a 
historical criterion avoids this difficulty because pseudo-scientists cannot alter 
the history of a discipline. Note too that the success of science is defined in a very 
particular way; the exclusionary convergence pattern was not expressed in terms
27
of truth or truthlikeness. The usual description of convergence is that current 
theories better approximate the truth than their predecessors. Not that truth is 
unimportant but there are serious difficulties in incorporating this concept in our 
understanding of convergence (Laudan 1981a). With our historical indicator we 
can meet the urgent need for identifying the genuine sciences without a criterion 
for truth.
While the indie nor of demarcation was not derived from basic judgments 
about which disciplines are scientific and which are pseudo-scientific, these 
judgments can be useful in checking the adequacy of this indicator. In the next 
section I w ill briefly  describe the history o f a classical science and 
pseudo-science to determine whether each conforms to the pattern expected by 
our indicator of demarcation. First, a consideration of physical optics.
The historical development of physical optics: does it display exclusionary
convergence?
If the indicator of demarcation is sound, we would expect the initial stages 
of the development of physical optics to be characterized by the occurrence of a 
number of competing explanations given to account for the nature of light, where 
these explanations differ widely. This is expected because there has been little 
feedback from the real world, so that almost any explanation can account for the 
"facts". This is exactly what we find. Kuhn (1962:12) states: ”No period 
between remote antii, ty and the end of the seventh century exhibited a single 
generally accepted view about the nature of light. Instead there are a number of 
competing schools and sub-schools, most of these espousing one variant or 
another of Epicurean, Aristotelian or Platonic theory.
One group took light to be particles emanating from material bodies; for 
anothe' it was a modification of the medium that intervened between the body 
and the eye; still another explained light in terms of an interaction of the medium
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with an emanation from the eye; and there were other combinations and 
modifications besides."
In short, there existed widely differing explanations of the nature and 
behaviour of light. Now according to our indicator of demarcation, if physical 
opocs is indeed a science, and we are quite certain it is, then later in its 
development it should display an ongoing limiting of the range of acceptable 
explanations. It will display exclusionary convergence; more and more theories 
will in time become clearly unacceptable. This is what we find.
In the nineteenth century there came to be two schools of thought over the 
nature of light. One school considered light to be particulate, the other took it to 
be wave-like. All agreed that light originated from the sun, reflecting off 
material objects and not usually emanating from them. What we find then is 
some disagreement about the nature of light, but a definite consensus about what 
is stnctiy unacceptable. There is a narrowing down of the number of recognized 
theories. The wide range of optical theories in vogue before the seventeenth 
century came to be discarded by nineteenth century scientists.
Physical optics seems to follow a specific historical pattern, described as 
exclusionary convergence, and indicative of scientific disciplines according to 
our indicator. As physical optics is quite obviously a science, the proposal is 
supported. There must be little doubt that Cell Biology is a genuine science. 
Interestingly enough, Bechtel (1984), whose concern was with distinguishing 
between good and bad science, has described the history of Cell Biology and it 
conforms to the pattern we would expect. He says that "within fields like cell 
theory I think we can see a process of theory change where successive theories 
do seem to approximate our current ones more than their predecessors did." The 
question now is whether our indicator clearly identifies a pstudo-science such as 
astrology.
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The historical development of astrology; does it display stasis in 
theoretical diversity?
For many philosophers of science today, astrology presents itself as a 
typical pseudo-science. A useful check of the adequacy of our indicator would 
be to see what it does with astrology. First, astrology will be defined. Then the 
indicators of a science will be briefly described. Lasdy, astrology will be 
evaluated in terms of our indicator.
Astrology has been defined as "the science of learning man’s character and 
destiny through a study of the governing forces radiating from the planets..." 
(Norvell 1970). It would be a major task to examine the whole of astrology, as a 
wealth of material has been written on the subject. This discussion will be 
restricted to one aspect, the nature of the supposed cosmic influences that control 
the destiny of man.
If astrology is indeed i  science, it should show a reduction in theoretical 
diversity with time. Since astrology is one of the oldest disciplines, and since the 
nature of these cosmic influences is such a fundamental issue, and if it is a 
scicnce, then certain basic alternatives as to the nature of the cosmic influences 
should have come to be excluded. For example at the most basic level it should 
be known whether the cosmic influences are supernatural or natural: Astrologers 
are undecided. Sometimes they speak as though the cosmic influences are 
natural: Raman (1972:48) ascribes wavelength, intensity and frequency to 
planetary vibrations. At the same time he is not past considering the cosmic 
forces to have a divine element. He does not find it unreasonable to believe that 
the stars are "the bodies of Great Beings replete with wisdom" (Raman 1972:44). 
At this fundamental level astro'"gers are not agreed.
i hey are not even decided on whether to call the cosmic agents influences. 
One author writes: "The present day astrologer does not think in terms of light
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rays or influences coming direct from each planet... the essential correspondence 
is one of space-time synchronization" (Mayo 1964:2).
Astrology has had centuries to come to an agreement about what is 
admissible and inadmissible. Instead it presents itself as a potpourri o f widely 
contrasting ideas, simply because it has failed to exclude any alternatives. It is 
unchanging Astrologists freely admit this fact, actually trying to use it to 
establish the scientific credentials of the discipline. This can be seen from the 
following statement by the astrologer Norvell (1970): "In the very fact that 
astrology has come down through the centuries unchanged except for the 
addition of new knowledge lies the greatest proof of its verity and force."
From the point of view of our indicator, these words far from vindicating 
astrology’s claims to be a science, condemn it. This fact supports the proposal as 
an effective indicator of demarcation.
That astrology docs not show a reduction in theoretical diversity is a 
prompt for us to look deeper. Its behaviour is symptomatic of a deeper problem: 
astrology is not a science because its notions are not subject to the dictates of the 
real world; therefore it cannot exclude any alternatives. This fact leads to its 
characteristic vagueness and lack of agreement as well as its characteristic 
pattern of historical development.
Having tested our indicator by examining the history of an obvious science 
and pseudo-science, it seems clear that it is an effective indicator o f demarcation. 
It now remains to evaluate the credentials of evolutionary biology and 
ereationism in terms of this indicator.
Is evolutionary biology a science?
My focus is not on any particular theory, but on the history of the 
discipline as a whole. If evolutionary biology is indeed a science, then we would 
expect its history to follow a pattern of decreasing theoretical diversity. It is the 
broad trend that we are interested in, so only a very brief history will be given
below.
Before Darwin there had been many views concerning the origin and 
diversity of life on earth. The fundamental tenets of these ideas varied 
enormously. Views ranged from naturalistic to supematuralistic, and from a 
static cosmic order to one of great flux and there were various combinations of
these.
Within supematuralism there was diversity. In some creation myths the 
universe was said to have a beginning (James 1969); for the Jains the universe 
was eternal (James 1969:45). The order of creation also differed. Forexampie the 
Crow Indians believed that the earth developed from water, while the Pawnee 
Indians believed that water came into existence after the earth (James 1969:5-6). 
In the Popol Vuh, the sacred writings of the Quiches, it is said that the various 
animals were rejects from attempts by the gods to make man. In other myths man 
is created first (James 1969).
Some tried to combine a naturalism and supematuralism. For example, 
Gregory of . yssa (331-396) held that God gave matter its fundamental 
properties and allowed these to develop into the completed forms. Similarly, 
Augustine (353-430) and Bruno (1548- 1600) tried to combine a concept of 
creation and change (Thomson 18°3:215). Augustine held that a germ of each 
species developed by secondary causes into mature forms (Butier 1931 :XVII). 
These gave a supcrnuturalistic account for the origin of the material o f life, but a 
naturalistic account for change and diversity in the living world.
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